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FROM THE ARCHIVES: CBN Report on Fuel Shortage & Prices in Nigeria (1998)
Central Bank of Nigeria
Special Economic Review Series
Vol. 1. No. 1: May 1998
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THE PERSISTENT SHORTAGES OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS IN NIGERIA: A RE-APPRAISAL 0F
CAUSES AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Government, in an attempt to satisfy the ever expanding demand for petroleum
products in the country, established four refineries, with a combined refining capacity
of 445,000 million barrels of crude oil per day. At full capacity, the refineries will
produce sufficient fuels for the domestic economy and a substantial surplus for export.
However, provisions were made for importation of petroleum products to complement
local production during emergencies. In spite of these efforts, the phenomenon of
petroleum products shortages which began in 1975 has persisted over the years. Owing
mainly to its telling effect on the economy, the issue of recurrent shortages has been of
great concern among various interest groups, including private sector investors,
manufacturers, households and policy-makers. For example, in 1990, it necessitated the
setting up of investigative studies and a judicial commission to unravel the underlining
factors in fuel shortages in the country. Also in 1995, a committee was constituted to
review the activities of the NNPC and its subsidiaries so as to find lasting solutions to
the problem.
2. Summary of Fuel Shortages Study
by the Research Department. 1997
Against the backdrop of protracted petroleum product shortages lasting for about
five consecutive months in the first half of 1997, the Research Department undertook
a diagnostic study on the causes of shortages of refined petroleum products in Nigeria
during the year. The study covered the period 1994 - 1997 and the major findings included
the following:
(a) Shortages in the Midst of Excess Supply:
With the exception of 1994, when prolonged oil workers’ industrial unrest
induced a substantial reduction in the level of production, the total volume of refined petroleum
products consumed during 1995 - 1997 period was, on an annual basis, below local production.
This, thus, raised the issue as to what could have happened to the excess aggregate supply,
including imports. This also raised the puzzle about the rationale for importation when domestic
production was considered adequate for local consumption.
(b) Fundamental Causes of Petroleum Products Shortages:
These were identified to include declining output at the refineries, capacity underutilization
and decreasing returns on investments, arising from:
(i) the ageing conditions and inadequate maintenance of the nation’s
refineries, resulting into recurring equipment failures and
breakdowns;
(ii) high turnover rate of the management of the refineries;
(iii) gross under-funding of NNPC operations; and
(iv) the impact of over-riding public ownership of the existing refineries
which until recently precluded private investors.
(c) The immediate causes of the 1997 shortages were observed to be -
(i) rampant pipelines bursting and the frequent incidence of fire
outbreak which tended to obstruct the supply system;
(ii) vandalization of the pipelines and illegal tapping of huge quantities
of refined petroleum products, between the refineries and the
depots, which resulted in substantial losses to the nation;
(iii) large scale smuggling and increasing diversion of petroleum
products from the depots, by the dealers/tanker drivers, which
accounted for a significant proportion of officially recorded
domestic consumption. The incentive to smuggle out petroleum
products to neighbouring countries was attributed to the substantial
product price disparity between Nigeria and her neighbours;
(iv) bottlenecks in the distribution of refined petroleum products
attributable to burst pipelines and bad management, as well as other
negative factors in the distribution network, including the
unionization and collusive activities of tanker drivers; and
(v) speculative activities among dealers and consumers which tended
to build-up reserves in private premises while artificial shortages
were created at the fuel stations.
To ensure a lasting solution to the perennial problem of shortages of petroleum
products in Nigeria, the paper recommended the following policy measures:
(i) Increased border patrols to curb illegal siphoning of petroleum products
to neighbouring countries and stern punishment for apprehended
smugglers and vandals of the pipelines network.
(ii) In order to tackle the problem of under-funding of NNNPC operations,
adjustments should be made to the share margin of the e revenue from
products’ sale to the Corporation while increase in the pump-head price
of petrol should be effected to attract adequate returns and leverage for
the operators in the refining industry.
(iii) The down-stream oil sector operators, in particular the refineries, should
be adequately funded so as to enable them perform optimally.
(iv) Evolvement of a 90-day strategic reserve system by the NNPC whereby
refined petroleum products could be stockpiled to meet demand during
emergencies, including periods for mandatory or routine repairs and
maintenance of the refineries and during other national emergencies.
(v) The reliance on locally refined crude oil and less dependence on imported
petroleum products for domestic consumption was cost effective, and
should be sustained.
(vi) Appropriate incentives should be offered to boost efficiency in the refining
industry. These should include motivation for staff and their training and
re-training so as to acquaint them, from time to time, with innovations and
technological changes in the sub-sector.
(vii) A special privatization programme that would focus on the participation
of indigenous investors, in the management of the refineries, should be
evolved. This, among others, would enable funds to be channelled to the
refineries through the capital market, and reduce dependence on
government subventions.
3. Policy Measures Taken by the Government in 1997
To address the problem, the government took a number of measures which included the following:
(a) accelerated maintenance, enhanced technical backup facility and
increased allocation of crude oil to the second Port Harcourt refinery,
which enabled it to increase its output by 30.0 and 17.0 per cent in the
second and third quarters of 1997, in relation to the first quarter. Also, an
enhanced crude oil allocation to the Warri refinery resulted in increased
production by 25.3, 26.4 and 34.4 per cent during the second, third and last
quarters of the year, respectively, compared to the first quarter;
(b) resumption of petroleum products importation which had been banned in
October, 1996;
(c) resolution of the impasse between the NNPC and the Nigerian Ports
Authority which enabled vessels carrying fuels to berth and discharge at
the ports, thus enhancing distribution of petroleum products; and
(d) restoration of the 30 days sales credit to marketers which was earlier
cancelled on account of mounting debts owed the NNPC.
These efforts yielded positive results as the supply of petroleum products increased and
their distribution improved considerably. From June 1997, therefore, normalcy
appeared to have returned as queues disappeared from the fuel stations for the remaining
part of the year.
4. Causes of Current Fuel Shortages
The problem of fuel shortages re-emerged in January 1998 and has persisted since then.
Shortages have been reported all over the country. The attendant phenomenal economic disruptions
and consumer welfare losses have become noticeable in most parts of the country in recent times.
Firstly, most businesses that have depended on private electric generators for power, given
NEPA’ s epileptic performance, can no longer operate them as a result of shortage of diesel and
petrol. Secondly, their vehicles cannot move freely to bring in raw materials and transport finished
goods to far away markets. Thirdly, workers cannot report for duty on time or in some cases may
not report at all as a result of commuting problems associated with the fuel crisis. Fourthly, many
commercial activities that normally depend on generators, such as restaurants, food storage,
bakeries, cold stores, photocopying and photography have suspended operations owing to
lack of fuels to power their generators. The story is the same for high income families that can
no longer operate their sets for lack of fuels.
The current shortages may be traced to the inability of the authorities to address
the more fundamental problems of the industry which were identified in the study
mentioned earlier. The problems include the following:
(i) poor maintenance of refining infrastructure which results into frequent
breakdown of machinery and equipment and eventual closure of the
refineries. All the refineries, except the second Port Harcourt, are ageing
and characterized by malfunctioning plants and equipment failure, and
therefore require constant maintenance to ensure efficient operations. The
Kaduna refinery which was shut down in July 1997, as a result of system
breakdown, has not re-opened as the needed turn around maintenance
(TAM) has not been done. In addition, the second Port Harcourt refinery
which currently accounts for over 50 per cent of total domestic production
was shut down for over two weeks in February, following the failure of
one of its three functioning boilers and damages to other equipment
caused by the boiler failure. The refinery has been overdue for a turn
around maintenance. The implication of these closures is that domestic
production has reduced substantially;
(ii) poor funding has been a major constraint to regular maintenance and
repairs at the refineries. Recently, approved funding for the NNPC was
estimated to be about 30 per cent of the resources needed for effective
running of the plants. Besides inadequate funding, the problem of delays
in release of funds has persisted and this has tended to delay the repair and
maintenance of machinery and equipment. The funding of the refineries
has not been helped by the formulae used in sharing the revenue from
sales of petroleum products. With a pump price of N11 per litre of fuel,
the PTF takes N5.30, Government N2.40, NNPC N2.00 and marketers,
including transporters and dealers N1.30. The share of NNPC which is
estimated to cover only about 34 per cent of refining cost, excluding other
costs, such as distribution, transportation and overhead, is considered to
be very inadequate. The NNPC is therefore demanding at least N5 which
will cover its refining cost and reduce its dependence for funds on the
government. On their part, the private operators have argued that N1.30
take per litre sold is grossly inadequate to given them a reasonable return
on their investments. They have therefore requested for an increase of 100
per cent to bring their share to N2.60. These arguments by both NNPC
and the private operators merit consideration as enormous resources are
required to maintain existing infrastructure and make new investments;
(iii) large scale smuggling of petroleum products to neighbouring countries has
continued in spite of the deployment of security operatives along the
borders. It has been estimated that about 2.63 million tonnes of fuel or 27
per cent of total domestic production is smuggled out of the country
annually. This massive outflow reduces the volume of fuels available for
local consumption and induces shortages of the products in the country.
The existence of wide price disparity between Nigeria and her neighbours,
arising from the downward slide of the naira exchange rate has offered
large incentives for illegal export of fuels. However, there has been a
counter view that smuggling will continue irrespective of the pump price
of petroleum products; and
(iv) vandalization of distribution pipelines and illegal tapping of petroleum
products, pipeline bursting and the incidence of fire outbreak within
refining and distribution infrastructure has continued, thus constraining
fuels distribution operations.
5. Recommendations
(a) Short Term Measures
(i) As a short term measure, there is need for massive and continuous
importation of petroleum products until the Kaduna and Port
Harcourt refineries are rehabilitated.
(ii) The sanctions for vandalization of pipelines and tapping of
petroleum products as well as smuggling and diversion of fuels
should be vigorously applied. Deployment of more security
operatives to guard refining and distribution infrastructure and
increased border patrols have become very necessary.
(iii) To improve the financial base of the sector, there is
need increase the pump-head price of petroleum products which
have remained unchanged since October, 1994, in spite of the
substantial price increases recorded in other sectors of the
economy.
(iv) There is need to have, at any point in time, a 90-day strategic
reserves of petroleum products to meet demand during
emergencies.
(b) Medium to Long Term Measures
(i) Timely repairs and maintenance of refining and distribution
infrastructure hold the key to adequate supply of petroleum
products to the Nigerian economy. Government should effect an
accelerated turn around maintenance at the Kaduna and Port
Harcourt refineries. For all the refineries, there is need to keep to
maintenance schedules as a means of ensuring efficient operation
of refining facilities.
(ii) The funding of refining and distribution activities can be improved
partly by increasing the share of NNPC in product sales revenue to
N5 per litre as requested by the Corporation. The request by the
marketers to increase their share in every litre of fuel sold by 100
per cent to N2.60 per litre also deserves support as this could
enable them generate substantial surpluses that can be ploughed
back to repair existing facilities and make new investments.
(iii) Another source of revenue to the NNPC is the privatization of the
refineries which, additionally, will bring in private sector expertise
to bear on the management of the companies.
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ALUKO NOTE:
See also:
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/important_documents/?u=NEIC_appendices_Nigerian_refineries.htm
National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC) Reports on Nigerian Refineries - Excerpts [1998/1999]
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